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Abstract
We propose a limit order book model with dynamics that account for both the impact of the
most recent order and volume imbalance. To model these effects jointly we introduce a discrete
Markov chain model. We then find the policy for optimal order choice and control. The optimal
policy derived uses limit orders, cancellations and market orders. It looks to avoid non-execution
and adverse selection risk simultaneously. Using ultra high-frequency data from the NASDAQ
stock exchange we compare our policy with other submission strategies that use a subset of all
available order types and show that ours significantly outperforms them.
Keywords: market microstructure, limit order books, markov decision processes, adverse selec-
tion, non-execution risk
1 Introduction
In most modern financial markets, trading activity is organized by a limit order book (LOB)
structure. Market participants can interact with the LOB through three types of orders: market
orders, limit orders and cancellations. A market order (MO) is an order to immediately buy or
sell a specific volume of shares at the best price available. A limit order (LO) specifies not only
the volume to buy or sell, but also the worst acceptable price, these orders wait in the LOB to be
matched by a counterpart for a trade. Cancellations (CO) of pending limit orders can occur at any
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time. Most LOBs match orders by a price-time priority rule. This means that pending LOs are
matched to MOs first based on their price, and then on their submission time. Understanding and
modelling the evolution of LOBs is of major practical importance and an extensive literature in the
topic exists. See Gould, et al. (2013) and Abergel et al. (2016) for a thorough survey of modelling
techniques for LOBs.
This paper focuses on two problems. First we extend existing LOB models to incorporate the
influence in order flow of both recent book events and the shape of the LOB. Then, under these
improved dynamics we show how to solve the problem of optimal acquisition of one lot of shares
using all order types dynamically depending on the LOB conditions.
The strategic behavior of market participants is always evolving. However, many statistical
properties have been observed in the order flow they produce on LOBs. The intensity rate of
the arrival of all order types is known to depend on the volume at the best bid and ask prices,
this was captured by the model proposed by Huang et al. (2015) with state-dependent Poisson
order flows. However, the time durations between events are not independent and display non-
trivial correlation patterns. Rambaldi et al. (2016) and Bacry et al. (2016) successfully model
these complex interactions between the arrivals of different order types with multivariate Hawkes
processes.
We perform an empirical analysis of high-frequency data showing that the distribution of the
type of the next order depends on the volume at the best prices as well as the type of the most
recent order. Our first contribution is the introduction of a discrete Markov chain model for the
LOB dynamics that incorporates simultaneously both of these effects. We find that different orders
impact immediate future order flow in significantly different ways. In our analysis, we describe in
detail this “instantaneous impact”, which we interpret as the immediate strategic reaction of market
participants to each new order arrival.
The framework we propose is related to some of the existing queuing models for LOBs.
However, there are several differences relative to some of the most well known models in the area:
Cont et al. (2010) and Huang (2015). We focus on a simplified version which models only the
best bid and ask and assumes constant spread of size one. There is a significant group of financial
assets where this assumption is realistic, the so called “large-tick” assets. See for example Dayri
and Rosenbaum (2015). The volume levels at the best prices along with the type of the last order
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observed, represent the state space of our Markov chain. We allow the transition probabilities
between states to depend on the volumes at the best prices as well as the type of the last order
observed. This allows our model to incorporate the influence of the LOB configuration and the
historical flows. The dynamics of our model occur in discrete steps according to “event time,” i.e.
the discrete clock advances with the arrival of each order. This allows us to estimate only the
parameters of interest to understand the evolution of the LOB, while capturing the most useful
properties of the order flow.
Widespread availability of high quality market data has led to an explosive growth in the
literature of high-frequency algorithmic trading. Modern markets are extremely competitive, and
market participants try to exploit all available information in order to trade optimally. One well
known source of predictive information about the future mid-price is the volume imbalance at the
best quotes. For example Gould and Bonart (2016) perform a large scale empirical analysis in this
topic. Studies show how to incorporate this predictive power into high-frequency trading strategies.
See Lehalle and Mounjid (2016), Donelly and Gan (2017), Jaquier and Liu (2017). The decay of the
predictive power of imbalance is not well understood. Cartea, et al. (2015c) use imbalance to predict
the mid-price after a fixed time horizon and Lehalle and Mounjid (2016) predict the mid-price a
fixed number of orders in the future. However, our empirical analysis in the Appendix shows that
imbalance is useful to predict the next two mid-price changes, but then it quickly loses its power as
a predictor for further mid-price changes. It is interesting to note that this fact is implied by most
queuing models, which assume that both queues are renewed randomly after a mid-price change.
Our primary focus is on the question of how to place orders in a LOB optimally under the
dynamics described by our model. We frame the problem of optimal acquisition of one share as
a Markov decision process. The optimal strategy derived involves all order types MOs, LOs and
COs. The acquisition price is benchmarked against the next mid-price after a change. This choice
is in part justified by the duration study of the imbalance signal and it shortens the optimization
horizons significantly so that the optimal strategy can be numerically computed very efficiently.
Lehalle and Mounjid (2016) use a different benchmark in their solution to the problem of optimally
controlling a limit order. But both benchmarks cause the optimal strategies to cancel limit orders
that face a high risk of adverse selection, i.e. buying (selling) when the price is about to go down
(up). Since our strategy also incorporates MOs, it aggressively takes liquidity by submitting market
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buy (sell) orders when the non-execution risk of a limit buy (sell) order placed in the book is high
and the price is about to move adversely up (down).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe in detail the data used
in our empirical study. In Section 3, we presents some findings of LOB order flow and introduce our
Markov chain model for the LOB dynamics. In Section 4, we introduce a Markov decision process
framework for optimal execution and an algorithm to derive the optimal strategy. In Section 5,
we present the derived optimal strategy calibrated to real market data and discuss some economic
insights gained. We summarize our results in Section 6. In Appendix A, we present a detailed
analysis of the decay of the predictive power of imbalance.
2 Data
We use data from the NASDAQ Historical TotalView-ITCH database from January 2nd to
March 31st of 2015. This dataset includes all MO, LOsand CO arrivals timestamped up to nanosec-
ond precision. On the NASDAQ exchange, each stock is traded on a separate LOB. The smallest
permissible price interval between different orders, also known as tick size, is equal to $0.01. Al-
though this minimal price interval is fixed, the prices of different stocks vary widely. A key dif-
ferentiator in market activity for each particular stock is the ratio of the tick size and its price.
Liquid stocks where this ratio is large are usually known as large-tick stocks, since the tick size
is large relative to the stock price. Many statistical properties of this group of stocks have been
described in the LOB literature. The most relevant ones for our study are that the spread, i.e. the
difference between the bid and ask prices, is almost always equal to one tick and that most of the
order submission activity occurs at the bid and ask price levels. See Dayri and Rosenbaum (2015)
for a detailed analysis of large-tick stocks.
The empirical analysis and results of model fitting are based on data from Microsoft (MSFT)
and Intel (INTC), however we have verified that our main conclusions hold for other large-tick
stocks. Our choice is based on sorting stocks by volume traded. From this sorted list we selected
the top stocks with a spread almost always constant and equal to $0.01.
As is common in the analysis of high-frequency LOB data, we exclude market activity from
the first 30 minutes after market opening and the last 30 minutes before market close, as well as
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any activity outside market hours. This is done to avoid the impact on our study of abnormal noisy
trading behavior that occurs during those periods. The volumes for all order types (MO, LO and
CO) are normalized by a factor equal to the median of the volume of all order types. We only track
the volume at the bid and ask prices. Therefore, all LOs and COs at other price levels are ignored.
We set an upper bound for the normalized volume at both price levels in order for the state space
of the LOB to be finite.
3 Order flow analysis and modelling
Empirical studies of high-frequency LOB data have shown that there are at least two major
factors in determining the submission rates of all order types, the volume levels at the bid and ask
prices, see Huang et al. (2015), as well as historical order flows, see Rambaldi et al. (2016). Our
goal in this section is to study how these two effects interact and incorporate them in a simple
discrete Markov chain model for LOB dynamics.
Let (V bt , V at ) denote the normalized volume levels at the bid and ask prices in the LOB. Also
define volume imbalance denoted by It as
It =
V bt − V at
V bt + V
a
t
(1)
It is well known that It influences future price dynamics. Gould and Bonart (2016) show in a
large sample study that It is a strong predictor of the next mid-price change for large-tick stocks.
This naturally implies that It impacts the order submission strategies of market participants. Huang
et al. (2015) study in detail how the submission rates of all order types depend on the volume at
each price level.
Numerous studies in the financial literature have documented the complex interactions be-
tween the arrival rates of different order types. The most remarkable and universal characteristic
is the self-exciting nature of these processes. Several models that account for these features exist.
Bacry et al. (2016) propose a multivariate Hawkes process to model all events at the first level of
the LOB.
It is clear then that the intensities of all order types depend both on recent orders and on
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the state of the LOB. Here, we present an analysis of both of these effects jointly. Let et denote
the type of the last order to modify the normalized volume at the bid or ask queue at time t. The
six order types we will consider are market buy (MB), market sell (MS), limit buy (LB), limit sell
(LS), cancel buy (CB) and cancel sell (CS) respectively. We will take the tuple (V bt , V at , et) as a
summary of both the state of the LOB and the historical order flow. Although simple, we will show
that this representation allows us to capture most of the statistical relationships of interest. Finally
let ti, i = 1, 2, . . . denote the clock times of the arrival of all orders that modify the volume at the
best quotes.
Assume for now that the spread of the LOB is constant and equal to one tick. For a given
summary tuple (V bt , V at , et), V bt and V at can only increase or decrease with the arrivals of an order
as in (2). By our discussion above, the probability that the next order observed is of a given type
should depend on the both the volume levels and the last order.
(V bti , V
a
ti , eti)
eti+1−−−→ (V bti+1 , V ati+1 , eti+1) (2)
To verify this hypothesis we first discretize the range of It ∈ [−1, 1] into 5 equal size bins.
Let Dt be this discretized version of imbalance. We wish to estimate the probability of observing
each of the six order types binned by what we will refer to as the reduced state of the LOB (Dt, et).
Equivalently, for each state (V tb , V
t
a , et) we reduce it into (Dt, et) and estimate the probability of
each order type that will first modify it. There are 30 such reduced pairs (5 imbalance levels and 6
order types) and 5 probabilities per reduced state (6 order types but probabilities must add to 1).
For a given reduced state st = (Dt, et) and last observed order type h = MB, MS, LB, LS, CB
and CS denote by phst the probability that a LOB with reduced state st is first modified by an order
of type h. The MLE of each of these probabilities is the empirical proportion of counts of observed
order h for a LOB in reduced state st. The results for the stocks in our sample are shown in Fig.
1 and 2. We split the reduced states by last order observed and plot the proportion of observed
counts for each order type versus the discretized imbalance. For example in Fig. 1 (a) given that
the last order observed was a MB we plot 6 curves that show how the probability of next observing
each order type varies with the discretized imbalance.
In the following sections we give a qualitative discussion of the results and their implications
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as well as the statistical significance of our estimations.
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(a) Previous event = MB
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(f) Previous event = CS
Figure 1: For MSFT data, each figure shows the empirical probability of each order type
conditioned on the state of imbalance of the imbalance of the LOB and the last order observed
(a) MB, (b) LB, (c) CB, (d) CS, (e) LS and (f) MS
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(a) Previous event = MB
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(b) Previous event = LB
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(c) Previous event = CB
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(d) Previous event = MS
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(e) Previous event = LS
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(f) Previous event = CS
Figure 2: For INTC data, each figure shows the empirical probability of each order type
conditioned on the state of imbalance of the imbalance of the LOB and the last order observed
(a) MB, (b) LB, (c) CB, (d) CS, (e) LS and (f) MS
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3.1 Statistical significance
We would like to test whether the last order observed has an instantaneous effect on the
order submission strategies of market participants. In Fig. 3 we show the empirical probabilities
of observing each order type but only conditioning on discretized imbalance Dt. If the last order
observed had no effect then panels (a)-(f) in Fig. 1 and 2 should all be similar to Fig. 3 respectively.
Informally it is clear from the figures that this effect souldn’t be ignored. To validate this formally
we proceed as follows.
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(a) MSFT
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(b) INTC
Figure 3: Empirical probabilities conditioned on imbalance for data on MSFT (left) and INTC
(right)
For each reduced state (d, e) and order type f , where d ∈ D = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} the set of
discretized imbalance values and e, f ∈ E = {MB, LB, CB, CS, LS, MS} the set of order types, let
pf(d,e) denote the probability that the next observed order is of type f conditioned on the LOB being
in reduced state (d, e). Similarly denote by pfd the probability that the next observed order type
is f conditioned on the LOB having discretized imbalance d. We propose the following hypothesis
test:
H0 : p
f
d = p
f
(d,e), ∀d ∈ D, e, f ∈ E (3)
HA : p
f
(d,e) = p
f
(d,e′),∃d ∈ D, e, e′, f ∈ E (4)
By our specifications this amounts to testing two nested multinomial models. One with a
set of parameters for each imbalance level and another with parameters for each combination of
imbalance and previous order type. Let pˆf(d,e) and pˆ
f
d by the MLE estimates for p
f
(d,e) and p
f
d defined
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before. Also let Nf(d,e) be the observed counts for order type f being observed next when the LOB
state is (d, e). The generalized likelihood ratio test statistic is given by
− 2 log Λ = 2
∑
d∈D
∑
e∈E
∑
f∈E
Nf(d,e) log pˆf(d,e)
pˆfd
 (5)
Under the null hypothesis the distribution of −2 log Λ is approximately χ2125. The results of
this test are shown in Table 1. It can be seen that there is significant evidence to reject the null on
both stocks in our sample. We remark that the observed order counts are not uniformly distributed
across reduced states.
Table 1: Nested models hypothesis test
Stock −2 log Λ p-value # Orders
MSFT 220000 10−16 20000000
INTC 150000 10−16 10000000
In the following sections we discuss empirical findings for each order type. We find that the
well known symmetry of LOB dynamics is fairly well respected. Therefore we will only focus on
describing the results from the perspective of the buy side of the LOB.
3.2 Market orders
We start our analysis by considering market buy orders (MB). The heat maps in Fig. 4 show
the probability of observing a MB conditional on the imbalance level and the last order observed.
A clear feature is that the probability of observing MBs increases monotonically with imbalance.
When the LOB is buy heavy, with a lot more volume at the bid or little volume at the ask, the next
mid-price move is more likely to be up. We will discuss this effect in detail in later sections. This
leads to orders rushing in to take the remaining liquidity at the ask before the price change.
The effect on MBs of the last order observed are significant. Same side market orders have a
strong exciting effect at all imbalance levels. This being more pronounced as imbalance increases.
Opposite side orders have an equally strong inhibitory effect. Limit and cancellation orders appear
to have little influence at all but the highest level of imbalance. These results are to be expected
since market orders have been found to be mostly influenced by other market orders Rambaldi,
Bacry and Lillo (2016).
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Figure 4: Heat map of empirical probability of MB orders conditional on the state of the LOB,
x-axis = last order observed, y-axis = imbalance for data on MSFT (left) and INTC (right)
3.3 Limit orders
We now consider limit buy orders (LB). The results are summarized in Fig. 5. Similarly as
with MBs we see that LB activity increases in general with the imbalance level. However the last
order observed appears to be the dominant factor. There is a significant excitation effect from same
side LOB activity. Observing a MB or LB significantly increases the probability that a LB will
follow, with the influence is of MBs more pronounced than that of LBs. All the effects are amplified
by the imbalance level. We also note that there is a symmetric inhibitory effect for opposite side LOB
activity. It is remarkable that this inhibitory influence is virtually independent of the imbalance
level.
MB LB CB CS LS MS
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
0.08
0.16
0.24
0.32
0.40
0.48
0.56
(a) MSFT
MB LB CB CS LS MS
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
0.08
0.16
0.24
0.32
0.40
0.48
0.56
0.64
(b) INTC
Figure 5: Heat map of empirical probability of LB orders conditional on the state of the LOB,
x-axis = last order observed, y-axis = imbalance for data on MSFT (left) and INTC (right)
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3.4 Cancellation orders
We conclude our analysis by considering cancellation of buy orders (CB). It is worth pointing
out that cancellation activity has also been shown to be dependent on the queue position of the
order Donelly and Gan (2017). Here we consider the probability of the arrival of a CB at any queue
position. As with the previous order types, imbalance is monotonically related to cancellation
activity. The effect of orders on the same side is strong, LBs and CBs have an exciting effect on
seeing a CB. This is to be expected since a lot of high-frequency trading strategies involve constant
queue repositioning. Perhaps surprisingly, other order types seem to have very little effect. We see
that the conditional probability that the next order is CB appears to depend only on imbalance
when the last order observed is a MB, CS, LS or MS.
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Figure 6: Heat map of empirical probability of CB orders conditional on the state of the LOB,
x-axis = last order observed, y-axis = imbalance for data on MSFT (left) and INTC (right)
3.5 Model
We now introduce the general framework to describe the LOB dynamics that will be used to
optimize high-frequency order submission strategies. As discussed before we will model the dynamics
only at the best quotes. In this case the LOB is seen as a 2-dimensional vector which describes the
number of limit orders at the bid and ask. To this we will add a categorical variable representing
the type of the last order that arrived to the LOB. So the state is summarized by (Vb, Va, e). Using
the same notation as in the previous section, Vb, Va are the numbers of orders at the bid and ask
respectively and e denotes the type of the last order observed e ∈ E = {MB, LB, CB, CS, LS, MS}.
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We model this 3-dimensional process as a discrete time Markov chain with finite states space
Ω = K2 × E, where K is the maximal queue size. By our discussion before, the evolution of this
Markov chain should depend on the state and history of the LOB. We summarize our assumptions
to model the dynamics of this model as follows:
1. Limit orders and cancellations are of unit size
2. Market orders’ sizes depend only on the queue size
3. The type of the next order arriving depends on the state of the chain
4. When a queue is depleted, the sizes of both the bid and the ask queues are resampled inde-
pendently according to an empirically estimated queue-size distribution.
This can be formalized by a 2-step procedure for a given LOB state (Vb, Va, e). First the type of the
next order arriving has multinomial distribution with parameter p(Vb, Va, e) = p(d, e) where d is the
discretization of the imbalance given by Vb and Va. That is, the order arrival type depends on the
queue sizes only through their imbalance. Then if the next order is a limit order or cancellation,
add or subtract a unit of volume on the corresponding queue and update e accordingly. If the next
order is a market order, the size is drawn from a distribution depending on the queue at which it
arrives, then update the volume level and last event accordingly.
If one of the queues is depleted then either the bid goes up or the ask goes down according to
a Bernoulli random variable with a stock dependent parameter which measures the probability of
consecutive price movements. (A detailed analysis of the mid-price evolution is given in Appendix
A.) Then after the price move direction has been determined, both queue sizes are resampled
independently. The estimation of all the parameters in the model are done via MLE.
3.6 Relationship with queuing models
The model we propose is intimately connected to well known continuous time Markov chain
LOB models which we will now explain. These models share, as a base assumption, that all orders
arrive as Poisson point processes. In the two most well known models, the intensities of these
processes are assumed constant Cont et al. (2010), dependent on the LOB shape Huang et al.
(2015) and time homogeneous in both. This last assumption allows us to look at these models in
12
terms of the embedded discrete time Markov chain that tracks only the states to which the process
jumps. The transition probabilities of this embedded chain are a simple function of the intensities
of the order arrival processes.
For each order type O ∈ {MB,MS,LB,LS,CM,CS}, let λO(Vb, Va) be the arrival intensity
of order type O as a function of the LOB state (Vb, Va) as in Huang et al. (2015). These intensity
rates are usually estimated via likelihood maximization, e.g. the rate of LB can be estimated by:
λLB(Vb, Va) =
1
Tˆ (Vb, Va)
NˆLB(Vb, Va)
Nˆ(Vb, Va)
where Tˆ (Vb, Va) is the average time the LOB was in state (Vb, Va), NˆLB(Vb, Va) is the total number
of LB orders observed in state (Vb, Va) and Nˆ(Vb, Va) is the total number of times state (Vb, Va) was
observed.
If all orders are assumed to have constant size 1 we can easily calculate the transition matrix
for the embedded chain. As an example:
P((Vb, Va)→ (Vb + 1, Va)) = λLB(Vb, Va)
λ(Vb, Va)
where λ(Vb, Va) is the sum of the intensities of all six processes. Similarly we can find the transition
probabilities to (Vb − 1, Va), (Vb, Va + 1) and (Vb, Va − 1). If only the embedded chain is of interest,
the transition probabilities can be estimated directly from the event counts at each state without
first estimating the intensities of the processes. This is the approach we take in our framework.
As a final observation we note that the intensities of the processes can be recovered from the
transition probabilities in our model together with the average time spent at each state.
4 Optimal order placement
In this section we consider the problem of how optimally to purchase one share in a LOB.
We assume that the trader is able to place and monitor his order reacting to each new order as
it arrives to the LOB. The trader’s objective is to minimize the cost of purchase given the state
of the LOB and its recent history. We allow the trader to submit LOs, cancel them, replace them
or send MOs depending on the given market conditions. This discrete optimal control framework
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Figure 7: Adverse selection risk
has gained popularity, see for example Lehalle and Mounjid (2016). Here we look to build on their
framework and extend it.
In Section 4.1 we motivate our approach for the optimal order placement strategy, in Section
4.2 we introduce the formal framework of Markov decision processes that will be used to derive
the optimal order placement strategy and in Section 4.3 we present a numerical algorithm that is
guaranteed to converge to the optimal solution.
4.1 Motivation
When interacting directly with the LOB via LOs and MOs market participants face two main
short term risks.
• Adverse selection risk shown in Fig. 7. This occurs when the trader has an active LO in the
book, the order is executed and then the price moves against him, i.e. a LB (LS) is executed
and then the price moves down (up). Ideally the trader would have cancelled his limit order
and waited after the price move. This would allow the trader to benefit from the decrease
(increase) by buying (selling) at a lower (higher) price.
• Second is non-execution risk shown in Fig. 8. This occurs when the trader has an active LO
in the book, the order isn’t executed and then the price moves against him, i.e. a LB (LS) is
not executed and then the price moves up (down). In this situation the trader should have
cancelled his limit order and submitted a MO before the price move.
There has been considerable work done to derive optimal trading strategies using LOB in-
formation. We offer two particular extensions which we will show help to reduce the risks of both
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Figure 8: Non-execution risk
adverse selection and non-execution. First, we explicitly model how order flow history impacts LOB
dynamics and measure its affect on optimal trading. Second, we make use of all of the order types
available to traders in real markets and show how LOs, COs and MOs are all essential to optimal
trading.
Our contributions in this problem can be summarized as follows. First the dynamics that we
assume for the evolution of the LOB incorporate the influence of both the state of the LOB and
recent historical order flow, which is more realistic than existing models. Additionally, our model
accounts for the instantaneous impact of the trader’s own orders in the subsequent evolution of the
LOB. Second, our study of the LOB imbalance signal allows us to define the objective function
in the trading problem more precisely by understanding the time horizon in which the imbalance
signal contains useful information. Finally and most importantly, we allow our trading strategy to
use all order types depending on the market conditions. This allows the trader to avoid the two
risks described above and obtain the optimal execution price.
4.2 Markov decision process formulation
In this section we briefly introduce the general framework of Markov decision processes and
then show how we can formalize and solve the optimal order placement problem. For a more general
treatment on the subject see for example Kochenderfer (2015).
Let M = (S, T ) be a Markov chain, where S is the countable state space and T its transition
matrix. A discrete Markov decision process (MDP) is a Markov chain where an agent is allowed
to take actions that affect the dynamic evolution of the system. Formally, it is a Markov chain
with three additional components, a finite set A of all possible actions, a function a : S → 2A that
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determines the actions admissible at each state and a reward function R : S×A→ R. The transition
matrix T is allowed to depend on the actions taken by the agent. A policy is a function pi : S → A
that maps each state s into an admissible action a(s). The expected reward U : S → R for the agent
with a given policy pi is given by:
U(s, pi) = E
[ ∞∑
i=1
R(si+1|si, pi(si))
∣∣∣∣∣ s0 = s
]
(6)
The problem facing the agent is finding the policy that maximizes the value function. That is,
for a state s the agent wants to know which admissible action a(s) maximizes his expected reward
given that he is in state s. Under mild regularity conditions for the MDP, the optimal policy pi∗
exists and its given by:
pi∗(s) = max
a∈a(s)
R(s, a) + ∑
s′∈N(s)
T (s′|s, a)Uk(s′, pi∗)
 , for every s ∈ S (7)
where N(s) is the set of states reachable from state s after taking action a. The expected reward
under the optimal policy is called the value function and is given by U(s) = U(s, pi∗). From the
value function it is trivial to recover the optimal policy.
4.2.1 Single period optimal order placement
We want to show how the problem of optimal purchase of 1 share can be represented as finding
the optimal policy in a MDP. We start with a simplified version of the problem where the trader
only has until the mid-price movement to buy the share. Our assumptions can be summarized as
follows:
• The spread is equal to 1 and doesn’t change throughout the trading period.
• The trader can have at most 1 LO active in the book.
• If the share hasn’t been bought and the mid-price moves the trader must immediately submit
a MB.
• Volume at the bid and ask is bounded by some constant K.
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Next we specify each of the components of the MDP:
• The state space S is given by the orders in front and including the traders’ order, the number
of orders after, the orders on the opposite side, the type of the last order observed E =
{MB,MS,LB,LS,CB,CS} and a categorical variable I describing whether the trader has
no active LO (a), active LO (b), bought the share with a LO (c) or bought the share with a
MO (d). We will denote the state of the process at time t by st = (V
b,1
t , V
b,2
t , V
a
t , et, it).
• For a given state st = (V b,1t , V b,2t , V at , et, it), following the notation used before we reduce it
to (Dt, et), where Dt is the discretized imbalance of the LOB. The transition probabilities at
state st depend on the probability of arrival of each order type given the reduced state (Dt, et)
as described in Section 3. Again we assume that all LOs and COs are of size 1 and the sizes
of MOs depend only on the size of the queue at which they arrive. We also define absorbing
states to be when either the bid or the ask has 0 volume. This determines the transition
matrix T completely.
• The set of actions A available to the trader are either to wait or to submit one of the three
order types MO, LO and CO. Which order types are admissible clearly depends on the state
st and our assumptions. If the trader has no order active in the LOB (it = a), then he can
submit a LO, a MO or wait. If he has an active LO (it = b) he can submit a CO or wait. If he
has already purchased the share (it = c or d) then his only available action is waiting. Every
time the trader submits an order, the queue sizes and et change, so the trader’s own actions
are reflected in the subsequent evolution of the LOB.
• The reward function R is taken to be the the mid-price after the bid or the ask is depleted
and refilled minus the acquisition price. The only states where the reward is non-zero are
the absorbing states of the chain. We can easily add a cost/rebate into the reward function,
for simplicity we omit these adjustments. This choice of reward function is motivated by our
analysis in Appendix A which shows that LOB imbalance has short term predictive power,
i.e., only until the next two mid-price change. The reward function can be summarized by:
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Table 2: Reward function in ticks
Bought with Mid-price up Mid-price down
MO 0.5 -1.5
LO 1.5 -0.5
MO after mid-price move -0.5 -0.5
4.2.2 Multi period optimal order placement
With some simple modifications the framework introduced before can be extended to allow the
share to be purchased over M mid-price changes to which we’ll refer as periods. The assumptions
are similar
• The trader can only have one active LO.
• If the share hasn’t been bought at the end of the M periods the trader must submit a MB.
• Volume at the bid and the ask are bounded by some constant K.
The components of the MDP in this case are:
• The state space S is extended to include the number mt of periods remaining. We also add
an additional value (e) to the categorical variable I to indicate that the share was purchased
on a previous time period.
• The transition matrix T remains mostly unchanged. In previous absorbing states, i.e. once a
queue was depleted, the system would transition as follows: time periods remaining mt would
decrease by one unless mt = 1 in which case we would reach an absorbing state, an active LO
that wasn’t executed is cancelled and the volume at both the bid and the ask are resampled
from the empirical distribution of the queue sizes.
• The set of actions A remains unchanged.
• For the reasons outlined in Appendix A, the reward function R is again taken to be the
difference between (i) the mid-price after the immediate next bid or ask queue depletion and
refill and (ii) the acquisition price.
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4.3 Algorithms and convergence
In this section we present algorithms to solve the optimal order placement problem. There
are many algorithms to derive the optimal policy on an MDP. Due to its simplicity and speed of
convergence we propose to use a value iteration algorithm. Once the value function is calculated, the
optimal policy can be easily derived by taking the action at each state that matches the expected
reward given by the value function. The value function for the single period problem can be
estimated by Algorithm 1 detailed below:
Algorithm 1 Value iteration algorithm
1: function ValueIteration
2: k ← 0
3: U0(s)← −∞ for all states s
4: repeat
5: Uk(s)← max
a∈a(s)
[
R(s, a) +
∑
s′∈N(s)
T (s′|s, a)Uk(s′)
]
for all states s
6: k ← k + 1
7: until convergence
8: return Uk
Once the value function U has been computed, we can extract the optimal action for each
state s by choosing a ∈ a(s) that maximizes:
R(s, a) +
∑
s′∈N(s)
T (s′|s, a)Uk(s′) (8)
For the multiple period problem the same algorithm above would converge to the value func-
tion. However given the structure of the state space a simple modification increases the convergence
rate significantly. The value function for states with m periods remaining only depends on the value
function at states with m and m − 1 periods remaining. This structure lends itself to a dynamic
programming type reorganization of the iterations in Algorithm 1. We can compute the value func-
tion in waves of states increasing in the number of periods remaining. The detailed Algorithm 2 is
shown below.
Convergence of both algorithms is guaranteed by the results proved in Hult and Kiessling
(2010). The only thing we need to verify is that under the universe of policies we consider, all of
them reach an absorbing state in a finite number of transitions with probability 1. This follows
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Algorithm 2 Dynamic value iteration algorithm
1: function DynamicValueIteration
2: j ← 0
3: U0(s)← −∞ for all states s
4: repeat
5: k ← 0
6: repeat
7: Uk(s)← max
a∈a(s)
[
R(s, a) +
∑
s′∈N(s)
T (s′|s, a)Uk(s′)
]
for all states s with j periods left
8: k ← k + 1
9: until convergence
10: j ← j + 1
11: until j = M
12: return Uk
immediately from the fact that every state in our Markov chains is connected to an absorbing state,
i.e. from every state there is positive probability to reach an absorbing state.
5 Description and performance of the optimal strategy
In this section we describe the characteristics of the optimal strategy for the order placement
problem with LOB parameters estimated from MSFT sample data. We point out in which states
of the LOB MOs, LOs and COs are optimal. Then we also present a simulation experiment, where
we compare our strategy with other common ones in the literature. With this experiment we show
the value of incorporating all order types into trading strategies.
5.1 Market orders
First we will discuss the LOB regions where MOs are optimal. In Fig. 9 the states of the
LOB in black indicate where the strategy submits MOs. We assume that the last order was a LB.
For other order types, the region changes slightly so we don’t include them here. The left panel
shows this region when there is 1 period remaining to purchase the share and the right panel shows
the region when there are 10 periods remaining to purchase the share.
There are several characteristics of these plots worthy of discussion. First it is clear that the
strategy is more aggressive when there is less time to purchase the share. When comparing the
regions in the two panels it can be seen that the MO submission region is much larger on the left
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plot. This is a desirable and intuitive quality of the solution. The strategy is more patient when
there is more time remaining. When there is only 1 period remaining and little volume on both
sides, the strategy submits MOs as soon as there is even a slight LOB imbalance. On the other
hand, when there are multiple periods remaining the strategy only submits MOs under extreme
imbalance.
Second, that the optimal strategy submits MOs only when the LOB is imbalanced matches
the observed order flow, i.e. MO submission is much higher when the LOB is imbalanced. We can
explain this intuitively by noting that if imbalance is an indicator of the future mid-price, then it is
natural to aggressively take the remaining volume before the likely price move. Alternatively a LO
placed under this scenario of imbalance would face significant non-execution risk, i.e. it is unlikely
to be executed before a mid-price change.
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Figure 9: Regions of the LOB where MO submission is optimal (black) for 2 different time
horizons for a trader looking to buy
5.2 Limit and cancellation orders
To complete the description of the strategy we now describe the regions where placing a LO
is optimal. We show the regions in black for 2 different time horizons in Fig. 10, the left panel
shows the region for 1 period remaining and the right panel for 10 periods remaining. Similar to
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the MO case the results are very intuitive. As more time remains the strategy is more selective for
when to place a LO. When there is more time available the strategy only places LO when the LOB
is balanced. The explanation for this last observation is simple. When the imbalance is positive
there is high non-execution risk for the LO and when imbalance is negative adverse selection risk is
high.
The strategy controls its LO (if any) with cancellations so that it only looks for executions
when the LOB conditions are favorable. We present the cancellation regions in terms of 3 dimensions
of the LOB state space (i) orders at the bid in front of our LO, (ii) orders at the bid behind our LO
and (iii) orders at the ask. To better visualize it, we show in Fig. 11 slices of the region each with
a fixed number of orders at the bid in front of our LO. For simplicity we only present the case of
10 time periods remaining. The strategy looks to cancel orders when the LOB is imbalanced in any
direction. It is more tolerant of positive imbalance when the order is in a good queue position. The
reason for this being that if the LOB imbalance is positive, the mid-price is likely to go up, but if
the order has high priority it has a good chance of being executed before the mid-price move.
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Figure 10: Regions of the LOB where LO submission is optimal (black) for 2 different time
horizons for a trader looking to buy
Having access to all three types of orders (MO, LO, and CO) helps to mitigate non-execution
and adverse selection risks in a way that is not possible if one of these order types is excluded. In
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Figure 11: Regions of the LOB where CO submission is optimal (black) where the trader’s order is
in position (a) 5, (b) 10, (c) 25 and (d) 50 at the bid
the case of MOs, it is clear that without the other two order types the trader would have no way of
capturing the remaining liquidity when the imbalance is significantly positive.
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5.3 Simulation
Lehalle and Mounjid (2016) give a model for LOB dynamics and a dynamic programming
algorithm for optimizing LO placement based on imbalance. In Appendix A, we give empirical
evidence that the predictive value of imbalance needs to be understood and utilized differently from
how it has traditionally been understood and used. We incorporate this new understanding into our
LOB dynamics for the purposes of the simulations in this section. In addition, we incorporate more
information from the LOB in the decision process and we allow a larger action space that includes
market orders and cancellations. The reason that we are able to incorporate more information
and a larger action space is that we use the value iteration algorithm to approximate the optimal
solution with less computational effort than direct application of dynamic programming. The second
strategy used as another benchmark is derived from Jacquier and Liu (2017). They solve a similar
optimal order placement problem, however their strategy uses LOs and MOs, but not cancellations.
Additionally in their setup the trader is only allowed to make a decision of what type of order to
place right after a mid-price change.
The setup for our simulation can be summarized as follows:
• The objective is to buy 1 share in 10 time periods.
• We simulate the dynamics of the LOB according to the model described in Section 3 for
100,000 paths.
• The reward function is the same one described in Section 4.
The strategies we compare in this simulation are listed below. The first is the one proposed in this
paper. The other two are taken from the optimal execution literature. All strategies are required
to submit a MO after the final mid-price move if they haven’t purchased the share.
• All orders: the order placement strategy that uses MOs, LOs and COs.
• No COs: this strategy only uses LOs and MOs. We also put the additional restriction of
not allowing MO if a LO has been placed. Since it can’t cancel stale LOs it is susceptible to
adverse selection and non-execution risk.
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• No MOs: this strategy only uses LOs and COs. Since it can’t aggressively submit MOs it is
susceptible to non-execution risk.
The results of our simulation are shown in Table 3. Overall the strategy that uses all order
types appears to be the best in terms of mean and standard deviation of the reward. We attribute
this superior performance to more flexibility and enhanced ability to react to different LOB condi-
tions. The strategy without COs can’t react when the LOB imbalance worsens and the trader faces
adverse selection risk. It also can’t react to non-execution risk when the volume at the opposite
side is decreasing. The strategy without MOs has similar issues. When the LO doesn’t have a good
queue position and the volume in the opposite side is decreasing this strategy faces non-execution
risk.
We also include (i) the proportion of shares purchased with LOs and MOs and (ii) the pro-
portion of LOs that were cancelled after being submitted. As one would expect, all strategies tend
to prefer buying the share with a LO. For the strategies that use COs we see that they end up
cancelling most of the LOs placed. The reason for this being that the strategies are constantly
adjusting their positions as market conditions become more favorable.
Table 3: Strategy simulation comparison
Strategy Mean reward Std reward Bought with LO % Bought with MO % LO cancelled %
All orders 0.35 0.29 77.62 22.38 71.34
No COs 0.21 0.43 62.16 37.84 0
No MOs 0.24 0.21 92.03 7.97 85.54
6 Conclusion
We have used order flow data from the NASDAQ Historical TotalView-ITCH to study the
dynamics of LOB for large tick stocks. We show that both previous orders and the relative volumes
at the best quotes have a major impact in the order submission strategies of market participants.
Our study shows that both effects are strong and neither should be ignored in LOB models. In
particular we show that MO activity is mostly dependent on previous MOs, whereas LO and CO
submission is dependent on LOB activity on the same side. Orders of all types are more common on
the side favored by the volume imbalance, i.e. positive (negative) imbalance triggers buy (sell) side
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activity. The main contribution of our work in this area is to model these effects jointly and detail
their interactions. Our approach to model the LOB dynamics differs from most of the literature
since we work on discrete event time. Every point process has equivalent representations in event
time and in clock time. We choose the event time representation because it allows us to focus on
those aspects of the LOB that we believe have the greatest impact on optimal trading.
We conducted an empirical study to determine the time horizon for which LOB imbalance
has predictive power. We show that for large-tick assets the spread follows an extremely predictable
alternating cycle between 1 and 2 ticks. Imbalance of the LOB has predictive power only in the
duration of its current spread cycle. When the spread equals 1, imbalance is a nontrivial predictor
of which queue (bid or ask) will deplete first. After the spread returns to size 1, the previously
observed imbalance is no longer predictive of further mid-price changes. This observation does not
conflict with previous empirical studies in the literature that show that imbalance is predictive of
the mid-price a fixed number of milliseconds or trades in the future. Our contribution is a clear
time bound (in event time) for this predictive relationship.
We then propose a solution to the problem of optimal order acquisition using all order types.
In our framework, the trader is looking to maximize the difference between (i) the mid-price after
the immediate next bid or ask queue depletion and refill and (ii) the acquisition price. The reason
for using this benchmark is our analysis (in the Appendix) that shows that the predictive power
of LOB imbalance decays after a mid-price change. We derive the optimal strategy by framing
the problem as a discrete time MDP. The introduction of the tools from the MDP literature is
another one of our main contributions. This framework is flexible and with the appropriate changes
to reward function and state space it is applicable to many other trading problems. The resulting
strategy has many desirable properties, including avoiding both non-execution and adverse selection
risks. It uses MOs aggressively when sell side volume is small to capture the remaining liquidity
when a move up in mid-price is likely, it places LOs when the LOB is balanced and it sends COs
when non-execution or adverse selection risk is high. We show, via simulation, how our strategy
outperforms others that don’t use all order types in terms of the expected reward. In practice,
high-frequency traders usually do not have hard constraints on the types of orders they are able to
place. Therefore we believe that our approach has significant applications.
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A Imbalance signal
It is known that imbalance has significant predictive power of future price changes on both
clock time and event time scales. Nevertheless, several interesting questions remain unanswered.
Gould and Bonart (2016) ask if imbalance provides useful information about the direction of several
price movements into the future. If so, how does this predictive power diminish over time? In this
section we present an empirical analysis that provides an answer to these questions: Imbalance has
strong predictive power over exactly the next 2 mid-price changes and then it decays to almost 0 for
later mid-price changes. Understanding the duration of this signal is crucial for the optimization of
order placement in the LOB as we described in Section 4.
The objective is to explain the relationship between the mid-price and imbalance. Under-
standing the time horizon of this relationship helps to justify the benchmark price that we used in
the optimal order placement problem in Section 4. Our claim is also compatible with an indirect
assumption made on most zero-intelligence models for LOBs where the spread is assumed to be
constant. In these models, after the bid or the ask queue is depleted, the mid-price is assumed to
move in the direction of the queue that disappeared and the volume levels of the new best bid and
ask prices are assumed to be drawn independently of the past from some given distribution. This
implies that these models predict that the imbalance after a mid-price change and return of the
spread to its constant size would have no power to predict any of the following mid-price changes.
This is exactly the result we verify.
A.1 Mid-price evolution
In this section, we study the evolution of the spread for large-tick stocks and show that it
follows a very predictable pattern. During regular trading hours the spread has an alternating cycle
between one and two ticks. Table 4 shows the transition probability of a spread of size one to a
spread of size two and vice versa. From these data it is clear that the spread is almost always 2 or
less, i.e. the spread rarely transitions from 1→ 3 or 2→ 3.
The time duration of the spread, which we measure as the time between changes in spread, is
dependent on the spread value. Fig. 12 shows the histogram of the duration of the spread for MSFT
stock split into two groups, spread equal to one tick and spread greater than one tick. When the
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Table 4: Empirical transition probabilities of the spread
Stock Spread 1→ 2 Spread 2→ 1
MSFT 99.92 % 99.89 %
INTC 99.95 % 99.91 %
spread is equal to one tick, the duration time varies between microseconds and seconds. When the
spread is greater than one tick (usually two ticks) the intensity of arrivals of limit orders between
the spread is very high, closing the gap quickly. In this case the duration time of the spread rarely
exceeds 1 millisecond.
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Figure 12: Histogram of the duration of the spread for MSFT stock conditional on the spread size.
Spread = 1 (left) and spread > 1 (right)
The phenomenon that will be of most interest in our study is mid-price change continuation.
Mid-price continuation occurs when an emptied queue is immediately filled by orders from the
opposing side. Empirically we have that the probability of this occurring is significantly larger than
being refilled from orders from the same side. The diagram in Fig. 13 shows the most common
evolution of the mid-price and the volume at the best quotes when one of the queues is depleted.
If the spread is 1 and the ask (bid) is depleted, the level of the ask is immediately filled
with buy (sell) orders. In terms of mid-price changes, this can be seen as there being a higher
probability of two consecutive changes in the same direction than alternating changes. In Table
5 we show that mid-price continuation occurs frequently for stocks in our sample. This empirical
probability drives the evolution of the mid-price in the model introduced in Section 3. In this
model, after a queue is depleted the mid-price goes up or down according to the empirical mid-price
continuation probability. After the new mid-price is determined then the sizes of both queues are
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Figure 13: Price continuation after ask being depleted
sampled independently from their empirical distributions.
Table 5: Evolution of mid-price changes for large-tick stocks, starting with spread = 1
Stock +→ + +→ − − → + − → −
MSFT 81 % 19 % 21 % 79 %
INTC 82 % 18 % 17 % 83 %
A.2 Mid-price prediction
In this section we study the relationship between imbalance and future mid-price movements.
In particular, we are interested in determining the horizon for which imbalance is a useful predictor.
A better understanding of this horizon will allow us to better exploit this signal in the optimal
order placement problem introduced in Section 4. Let I(t) denote the queue imbalance at t. Also
denote by t− and t+ the instants in time right before and right after time t so that no LOB event
occurs between t− and t or between t and t+. Let t1 < t2 < . . . < tN denote the times at which
the mid-price changes during the period under consideration. Finally let tτi be a time sampled
uniformly at random between ti and ti+1.
The setup of our experiment can now be described as follows, we fit a nine logistic regression
models, each having one of the three predictor variables I(ti−1+), I(tτi), I(ti−) and one of the three
response variables ∆(ti+1),∆(ti+2),∆(ti+3), where ∆(ti+1) = sign(p(ti+1)− p(ti)). For each pair of
predictor x and response y we model
yˆ = P(y = 1|x) = 1
1 + e−αx
(9)
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We use this probabilistic model as a classifier by taking
f(x, α) =

1 if yˆ ≥ 1/2
−1 otherwise
(10)
The results are summarized in Table 6 where we show the classification accuracy of each pair
of predictor and response
Table 6: Results of out of sample classification accuracy of logistic regression model on MSFT data
∆(ti+1) ∆(ti+2) ∆(ti+3)
I(ti−1+) 65 % 54 % 51%
I(tτi) 77 % 62 % 51%
I(ti−) 85 % 68 % 52%
There are several intuitive results worth noting. Clearly the imbalance signal does have
nontrivial predictive power for future price changes. Imbalance is a more accurate predictor the
closer it is sampled to the mid-price change, which time is of course unknown before the fact. The
most extreme case is the model ∆(ti+1) ∼ I(ti−), where the imbalance is sampled the instant before
a price change and the simple logistic regression model achieves 85% classification accuracy. This
predictive power decays in time, but more specifically, imbalance sampled at instant t− seems to
lose all predictive value for the third or later mid-price changes in the future.
This study gives a very well defined lifetime for the value of imbalance as a mid-price predicting
signal. For I(ti−), once the mid-price has changed two times, the signal loses all predictive value
for any further mid-price changes. Nevertheless, the above result is compatible with studies that
show that imbalance can predict the accumulated price change over a fixed number of future trades
as in Lehalle and Mounjid (2016) or over a fixed number milliseconds into the future as in Cartea
et al. (2015c). For example, suppose that we look at a future time interval that is long enough
so that there is high probability that multiple price changes will occur. Then I(ti−) predicts
∆(ti+1) + ∆(ti+2) very well, and the accumulated price change over the rest of the interval is equal
to ∆(ti+1) + ∆(ti+2) plus random noise, which is predicted less well as more noise accumulates.
The result is also compatible with the assumption of our LOB model that the dynamics at the
best quotes follow a renewal type process after each mid-price change where the queue sizes are
resampled after a mid-price change.
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